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[1433] 
The Spider’s Parlor: Government  
Malware on the Dark Web 
KALEIGH E. AUCOIN* 
The United States government’s use of what it refers to as “Network Investigative 
Tools,” presents several constitutional and privacy-related issues. Revelations 
stemming from the use of these NITsa form of malwarewarrant a difficult 
discussion on the conflict between public transparency and the level of secrecy 
required to maintain effective law enforcement. It is especially difficult to focus upon 
this concern in the context of investigations tackling child pornography, given the 
unforgiveable nature of crimes against children, and the dire need to apprehend 
predators. However, the real unease is regarding how online surveillance is 
conducted, rather than that it is conducted at all. The problem is that unlike certain 
other forms of technology (for example, phones), there is currently no statutory 
framework in place to guide law enforcement, the courts, or the public for government 
hacking. This Note seeks to convey the importance of remaining unblinded by the ends 
and careful with the means so as not to conflate the significance of the need to capture 
serious offenders with the justification of ignoring civil liberties. 
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The Spider turned him round about, and went into his den,  
For well he knew the silly Fly would soon come back again:  
So he wove a subtle web, in a little corner sly,  
And set his table ready, to dine upon the Fly.1 
INTRODUCTION  
Over the last few decades, whispers of an Orwellian surveillance 
state2 in the United States have escalated as leaked documents continue 
 
 1. MARY HOWITT, THE SPIDER AND THE FLY (1829). The title of this Note is inspired by this poem 
as the cautionary tale warns against falling prey to a predator masking his true intentions behind 
flattery. Here, the masking used by the predatorToris infiltrated by government relying upon that 
predator’s sense of safety behind technology. 
 2. See, e.g., Cora Currier et al., Mass Surveillance in America: A Timeline of Loosening Laws 
and Practices, PROPUBLICA (June 7, 2013), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/surveillance-
timeline (providing background on a series of leaks exposing mass surveillance programs run by the 
National Security Agency). 
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to expose secret government programs of Big Brother invasions.3 This 
information has brought law enforcement activities formerly in the dark 
into the light of public scrutiny. The fight for privacy is now a race 
between the government and the individualone upping the ante 
through mass invasions of privacy, the other responding with more 
creative forms of technological concealment.4 Unsealed court documents 
reveal, however, a dangerous tool in the government’s arsenal: hacking.  
This Note describes the development of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (“FBI”) use of Network Investigative Tools (“NITs”) in 
four parts, analyzing the issues surrounding government hacking. First, 
the Note provides a brief background of privacy in digital spaces. Next, 
the Note describes the obstacles posed by law enforcement with growing 
advances in privacy-enhancing technology. Then, the Note details an 
explanation of hacking generally, followed by a discussion of government 
hacking specifically with a particular focus on the “Playpen” cases.5 
Finally, the Note analyzes the implications of government hacking and 
concludes that Congress should enact a comprehensive statute like Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“Wire Tap Act” 
or “Title III”)6 to set clear standards and guidance for law enforcement, 
thereby legitimatizing its hacking operations and safeguarding individual 
liberties through oversight.  
I.  GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE: THE GOVERNMENT’S FLYTRAP  
A. THE TANGLED WEB WE WEAVE: A PUBLIC SPIDERWEB7 
The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”8 The 
Supreme Court was clear in Katz v. United States“the Fourth 
 
 3. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 3 (Plume Centennial ed. 1983) (1949) (“You had 
to livedid live, from habit that became instinctin the assumption that every sound you made was 
overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.”). 
 4. See Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act,  
56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 19 (2004) (“There has been an ongoing arms race between law enforcement agents 
who want to use electronic surveillance and those who want to avoid monitoring.”). 
 5. See infra Part IV. 
 6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2016). 
 7. See SIR WALTER SCOTT, Canto Sixth: The Battle, in MARMION: A TALE OF FLODDEN FIELD IN SIX 
CANTOS, XVII 169 (1892) (“Oh, what a tangled web we weave, [w]hen first we practice [sic] to 
deceive!”); Paul Gil, The Difference Between the Internet and the Web, LIFEWIRE, 
https://www.lifewire.com/difference-between-the-internet-and-the-web-2483335 (last updated 
Nov. 2, 2017) (calling the Internet “a public spiderweb of millions of personal, government, 
educational and commercial computers”). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
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Amendment protects people, not places.”9 Katz also provided that 
constitutional protections are afforded to that which one aims to keep 
private, but clarified that no such protection exists over anything one 
“knowingly exposes to the public[.]”10 The result of Katz is that, in order 
to be protected from unreasonable searches, an individual must manifest 
a subjective expectation of privacy that “society is prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’”11 Individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information freely provided to third parties.12 Consequently, 
any information that one reveals to a third-party service provider to 
facilitate communications is not protected.13 In short, just as one 
assumes the risk of trusting “false” friends with confidential 
information,14 one cannot rely upon the privacy of bank records,15 
telephone numbers dialed,16 Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses,17 or 
metadata.18  
A person’s expectations of privacy in the home19 are complicated by 
the reality that people do not need to physically leave their four walls to 
lose the home’s traditional protections when entering digital spaces.20 
 
 9. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (emphasis added). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 12. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment does 
not offer protection to “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides 
his wrongdoing will not reveal it”) (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)); United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (providing “one contemplating illegal activities must realize 
and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police”). 
 13. OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 6 (3d ed. 2009).  
 14. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
 15. Id.  
 16. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (“All telephone users realize that they must 
‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching 
equipment that their calls are completed.”). 
 17. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, however, the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits have all held that that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their IP addresses. United States v. Johnson, No. 15-00340-01-CR-W-GAF, 2016 WL 6136586, at 
*3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2016). See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(“[u]sers have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or [] IP 
addresses . . . because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet 
service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information.”). 
 18. “Metadata” refers to “data about data” or “a means by which the complexity of an object is 
represented in a simpler form.” JEFFREY POMERANTZ, METADATA 12 (2015). Metadata in an email 
includes the to/from fields, the IP addresses of the servers handing the email’s transition from origin 
to recipient, and the subject line, whereas the contents are the body of the email itself. Forrester,  
512 F.3d at 510. 
 19. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth 
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”). 
 20. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209–10 (2004).  
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The Internet is a collection of millions of connected computers and 
devices throughout the world, which is not owned, controlled, or 
governed by any single authority.21 It serves as an incredible tool for 
communication, dissemination of information, and collaboration across 
the globe.22 However, it is easy to forget that every click a user makes 
corresponds to a log somewhere else.23 All data that individuals 
consumebe it images, audio, or timeis broken down into small units 
of communication which are transmitted through digital networks and 
then reassembled upon reaching their destination.24  
One is able to connect to the Internet at home by subscribing to it 
through third-parties called Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) such as 
Comcast or AT&T.25 When a subscriber connects to the Internet, their 
ISP issues a unique IP address to that subscriber’s computer terminal.26 
This identifier consists of a string of numbers and letters used to identify 
devices and route network traffic on the Internet.27 IP addresses can be 
used to identify the subscriber’s geographic location, ISP, and the 
identity of the person who pays for the ISP account.28 However, obtaining 
information associated with a given IP address is not as simple as a 
click.29 Beyond this, an IP address can change often, and ISPs generally 
only keep records of IP addresses assigned to a given subscriber for a 
period between thirty and ninety days,30 after which time, the IP address 
 
 21. Paul Gil, Internet 101: Beginners Quick Reference Guide, LIFEWIRE, 
https://www.lifewire.com/internet-101-beginners-quick-reference-guide-2483357 (last updated July 
19, 2017). 
 22. BARRY M. LEINER ET AL., INTERNET SOC’Y, Brief History of the Internet 1997 2 (2017) (“The 
Internet represents one of the most successful examples of the benefits of sustained investment and 
commitment to research and development of information infrastructure.”). 
 23. FRANCIS M. ALLEGRA ET AL., PLUGGED IN: GUIDEBOOK TO SOFTWARE AND THE LAW app. 3A (5th 
ed. 2015). 
 24. Nadeem Unuth, Data Packets: The Building Blocks of Networks, LIFEWIRE, 
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-a-data-packet-3426310 (last updated Feb. 9, 2018). 
 25. Paul Gil, Top 20 Internet Terms for Beginners, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/ 
top-internet-terms-for-beginners-2483381 (last updated July 30, 2017).  
 26. United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 563 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 27. AARON MACKEY ET AL., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNRELIABLE INFORMANTS: IP ADDRESSES, 
DIGITAL TIPS AND POLICE RAIDS 5 (2016), https://www.eff.org/files/2016/09/22/ 
2016.09.20_final_formatted_ip_address_white_paper.pdf; Gil, supra note 25. 
 28. Kevin Mitnick, Famed Hacker Kevin Mitnick Shows You How to Go Invisible Online, WIRED 
(Feb. 24, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/famed-hacker-kevin-mitnick-shows-
go-invisible-online/ (“Any communication, whether it’s email or not, can be used to identify you based 
on the [IP] address that’s assigned to the router you are using while you are at home, work, or a friend’s 
place.”).  
 29. See MACKEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 5–6 (“[T]here is no central map or phonebook that 
connects IP addresses to particular locations, particularly given that IP addresses are often reassigned 
to different Internet users over time. . . . [So] unlike street addresses, IP addresses are not static.”). 
 30. Christie, 624 F.3d at 563 (discussing the difficulty posed when known IP address have gone 
stale due to the time between access to the IPs and subpoenaing ISPs).  
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may be assigned to someone else.31 Further, website administrators 
cannot see the name associated with a given IP address as ISPs hold that 
information, and generally require subpoenas to disclose it.32  
It follows that when one visits a website, one leaves a trail behind, 
as certain information, including one’s IP address, is recorded by that 
website.33 Today, people consider their computers, phones, and smart 
tablets, incredibly private, as one is able to instantaneously send 
exceedingly personal information to anyone from anywhere in the world 
with a simple click.34 This convenience continues to change society’s 
understanding of what it means to keep something private.35 However, 
people still precariously cling to an illusion of privacy despite the slow 
erosion of its protections in a digital age.36 Advances in privacy-
enhancing technologies work to guard against the mounting insecurities 
posed by digital spaces.37  
B. “GOING DARK”: ENCRYPTION AND PEELING BACK LAYERS OF THE 
ONION ROUTER  
Encryption provides one form of security in communication by 
scrambling one’s data so that an intercepting party is unable to decipher 
 
 31. MACKEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 5–6. 
 32. See Christie, 624 F.3d at 562; Joshua J. McIntyre, Comment, Balancing Expectations of 
Online Privacy: Why Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected as Personally Identifiable 
Information, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 897 (2011) (“By comparing its own IP address logs to those 
maintained by the Internet’s Web servers, an ISP can readily link online activity to a specific subscriber 
account.”). 
 33. Paul Ohm, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate 
Judges, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (“[P]eople produce and retain personalized digital information at a 
rapidly increasing rate. . . . [O]ur web browsers remember[] every website we visit, stor[e] the 
addresses in history and copies of the pages themselves in cache.”); Bradley Mitchell, WWW–World 
Wide Web, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/history-of-world-wide-web-816583 (last updated 
Dec. 27, 2017) (“[S]ignificant amounts of personal information including a person’s search history and 
browsing patterns are routinely captured (often for targeted advertising purposes) along with 
some geolocation information.”). 
 34. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).  
 35. KEVIN MITNICK, THE ART OF INVISIBILITY 5 (2017) (“Many of us . . . now accept to at least some 
degree the fact that everything we doall our phone calls, our texts, our e-mails, our social 
mediacan be seen by others.”). 
 36. See Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for A Legal Framework, 43 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008); Freiwald, supra note 4, at 13 (“If we reach a point where we can keep 
nothing from the government’s prying eyes, then we will have lost not only our privacy, but the full 
exercise of our rights of speech, association, and dissent. In important ways we will have lost our 
democracy.”). 
 37. See Sam Guiberson et. al., A Beginner’s Guide to Surveillance, Digital Security, and the 
Privilege, 40-AUG CHAMPION 52, 55 (2016) (“It is critical to remember that security is a process, not a 
purchase. No tool is going to give you absolute protection from surveillance in all circumstances.”). 
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it.38 Though an important tool for secure communications,39 by all FBI 
accounts, encryption places the world in jeopardy of “going dark.”40 The 
concern is that encryption prevents law enforcement from obtaining 
information, even with a court order, from encrypted devices.41 Law 
enforcement maintains that steps must be taken in order to ensure that 
the government has access to this information; one such suggestion is 
mandating exceptional access or platform backdoors.42 However, the call 
for these type of solutions is controversial because security specialists 
warn of the inherent risks involved.43 Furthermore, even if law 
enforcement is able to decrypt the message sent, it means little if they 
cannot identify where that message was sent from.  
Technology which enables additional anonymity is especially 
problematic for law enforcement because it impedes government’s 
attempts to pinpoint those engaging in nefarious activities online.44 
Enter “Tor,” or “The Onion Router,” a service comprised of two parts: 
downloadable software which allows users to access the web with 
anonymity, and a volunteer network of computers from around the world 
which enables that software to function.45 Tor was originally developed 
for the purpose of guarding government communications in the mid-
 
 38. This process is accomplished by using algorithms in combination with a piece of secret data 
called a “key.” Nadeem Unuth, What Is End-to-End Encryption?, LIFEWIRE, 
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-end-to-end-encryption-4028873 (last updated Feb. 23, 2018); 
Steven M Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the 
Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 39 n.171 (2014). 
 39. See Gary C. Kessler, An Overview of Cryptography, GARYKESSLER.NET, 
http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html#purpose (last updated Feb. 22, 2018) (“In data and 
telecommunications, cryptography is necessary when communicating over any untrusted medium, 
which includes just about any network, particularly the Internet.”). 
 40. See HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., KEYS UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING INSECURITY BY REQUIRING 
GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO ALL DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS (2015); Johnathan Mayer, Government 
Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 577 (2018) (“One aspect of the [going dark] debate is indisputable: certain 
law enforcement techniques for electronic searches and seizures are no longer effective, and the 
natural substitute for those techniques is hacking.”). 
 41. Editorial Board, Opinion, Putting the Digital Keys to Unlock Data Out of Reach of 
Authorities, WASH. POST (July 18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
putting-the-digital-keys-to-unlock-data-out-of-reach-of-authorities/2015/07/18/.  
 42. See James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at Brookings Institution: 
Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course? (Oct. 16, 2014) 
(providing that law enforcement suffers from “F.O.M.O.” or “fear of missing out” as a result of 
encryption); KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ENCRYPTION AND THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 
(2016) (summarizing the “going dark” debate). 
 43. See ABELSON ET AL., supra note 40 (discussing the risks of mandated backdoors). 
 44. See Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balances Between Public Safety and 
Privacy, Remarks Before the S. Judiciary Comm. (2015) (joint statement of James B. Comey, Dir., 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation & Deputy Att’y Gen. Sally Yates, explaining the obstacles posed to law 
enforcement). 
 45. This volunteer network is made up of “relays,” “routers,” and/or “nodes” which come in three 
kinds: “middle relays, exit relays, and bridges.” What Is Tor?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/torchallenge/what-is-tor.html (last visited May 7, 2018). 
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1990s as a project of the United States Naval Research Laboratory.46 
Currently, Tor is a nonprofit organization and it continues to be funded 
in part by the government because the United States recognizes its 
value.47 Intelligence agencies and law enforcement are said to court “a 
love-hate relationship with Tor” because although these agencies use Tor, 
their investigations are hindered when targets use Tor as well.48  
When most people think of the Internet, they think of the surface 
web: that is, anything which is indexable by a search engine like Google.49 
But what appears on the surface is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg 
because most of the Internet “is submerged below.”50 This un-indexable 
part of the Internet is known as the “deep web” which refers to everything 
which cannot be found via search engines.51 Within the deep web exists 
the dark web. The dark web refers to online content which can only be 
accessed with the use of “specialized encryption software”52 like that of 
Tor.53 On the dark web, there are special websites which end in “.onion” 
known as “hidden services”54 with “theoretically untraceable” physical 
locations.55 These physical locations are “theoretically untraceable” 
because the hidden services are masked behind layers of routing like an 
onion.56 Despite the legitimate uses of many of these sites,57 Tor is also 
 
 46. Users of Tor, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en (last visited 
May 7, 2018); ONION ROUTING, https://www.onion-router.net/ (last visited May 7, 2018). 
 47. Tor: Myths and Facts, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/document/tor-myths 
-and-facts (last visited May 7, 2018). 
 48. Kevin Poulsen, Visit the Wrong Website and the FBI Could End Up in Your Computer, WIRED 
(Aug. 5, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/08/operation_torpedo/. 
 49. Clearing Up ConfusionDeep Web vs. Dark Web, BRIGHT PLANET (Mar. 27, 2014), 
https://brightplanet.com/2014/03/clearing-confusion-deep-web-vs-dark-web/. 
 50. THOMAS OLOFSSON, INTELLIAGG, DEEP LIGHTSHINING A LIGHT ON THE DARK WEB (2016), 
https://media.scmagazine.com/documents/224/deeplight_(1)_55856.pdf (utilizing the metaphor of 
a glacier to illustrate the “size discrepancy” between the surface web and the deep web). 
 51. TELECOMMUNICATION MARKETS: DRIVERS AND IMPEDIMENTS 143 (Brigitte Preissl et al. eds., 
2009). 
 52. OLOFSSON, supra note 50. 
 53. BRIGHT PLANET, supra note 49.  
 54. Tom Simonite, “Dark Web” Version of Facebook Shows a New Way to Secure the Web, M.I.T. 
TECH REV. (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/532256/dark-web-version-of-
facebook-shows-a-new-way-to-secure-the-web/.  
 55. Poulsen, supra note 48; see Jesse Atlas, Opinion, Insider Trading on the Dark Web, FORBES 
(Mar. 25, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/25/insider-trading-on-
the-dark-web/#1e3674d46a61 (“Without an IP address, it is nearly impossible to trace users back to 
their computers. Thousands of people evaded the FBI by using the Tor browser to do illicit deals on 
sites like The Silk Roadthe e-bay for drugs, guns, and hit men.”). 
 56. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 57. See, e.g., Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on 
the Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1087 (2017) (discussing how Tor provides protection from two 
different types of surveillance: traffic analysis and acquisition of metadata); Mike Tigas, A More Secure 
and Anonymous ProPublica Using Tor Hidden Services, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 13, 2016, 10:45 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/nerds/a-more-secure-and-anonymous-propublica-using-tor-hidden-
services (providing that a hidden service version of the site was launched to protect readers from 
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brimming with illicit activities.58 More troubling is that the dark web acts 
like a nefarious whack-a-mole, so that once one elicit enterprise is taken 
offline, another pops up in its place.59 Just as people with legitimate 
purposes,60 those who use Tor for reprehensible purposes do so with 
complete anonymity61 so the government has had to get creative in its 
tactics. 
II.  GOVERNMENT HACKING 
A. KNOWN FBI OPERATIONS 
“Hacking” refers to the manipulation and bypassing of systems to 
force those systems to do something unintended.62 While the act of 
hacking historically did not denote the manipulation of computer 
systems, today, the term usually pertains to “any technical effort to 
manipulate the normal behavior of network connections and connected 
systems.”63 “Hacker” is not an inherently criminal term and generally, 
hackers come in three flavors: white hats, gray hats, and black hats.64 One 
of the ways that hackers execute criminal schemes is through the use of 
malwareshort hand for “malicious software”which refers to any kind 
of software that is explicitly intended to obtain access to one’s computer 
 
surveillance because “[o]ur readers should never need to worry that somebody else is watching what 
they’re doing on our site”); David Talbot, Dissent Made Safer, M.I.T. TECH. REV. (Apr. 21, 2009), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/413091/dissent-made-safer/ (discussing how Tor is enabled to 
circumvent government censorship and surveillance).  
 58. See, e.g., Buying Drugs Online: Shedding Light on the Dark Web, ECONOMIST (July 16, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/news/international/21702176-drug-trade-moving-street-online 
-cryptomarkets-forced-compete (providing an in-depth study of drugs on the dark web). 
 59. See Steven Nelson, Buying Drugs Online Remains Easy, 2 Years After FBI Killed Silk Road, 
U.S. NEWS (Oct. 2, 2015, 3:12 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/02/ 
buying-drugs-online-remains-easy-2-years-after-fbi-killed-silk-road (“[M]ore than half of 
anonymous marketplaces implement websites that are directly derived from them template the Silk 
Road used, and from formatting all the way to policy Silk Road invented the status quo that actors in 
this space have come to expect[].”). 
 60. The anonymity offered by Tor is important as attorneys, corporations, journalists, and 
governments all use Tor. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Elec. Frontier Found., at 3, U.S. v. Matish, No. 
4:16-cr-16 (E.D.Va. May 9, 2016); Simonite, supra note 54 (“Tor users include dissidents trying to 
avoid censorship, criminals, and U.S. government workers who need to escape scrutiny from foreign 
scrutiny services.”). 
 61. See Guiberson et al., supra note 37.  
 62. See Paul Gil, The Greatest Computer Hacks, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/ 
the-greatest-computer-hacks-4060530 (last updated Sept. 19, 2017). 
 63. Bradley Mitchell, What Is Hacking?, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/definition-of-
hacking-817991 (last updated Mar. 12, 2018). 
 64. For a discussion on the distinction, see Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Are White Hat, 
Gray Hat, and Black Hat Hackers?, WIRED (Apr. 13, 2016, 5:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/ 
2016/04/hacker-lexicon-white-hat-gray-hat-black-hat-hackers/. 
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without computer the owner’s consent.65 Malware comes in many forms, 
including: spyware,66 ransomware,67 keyloggers,68 viruses,69 “or any type 
of malicious code that infiltrates a computer.”70 When any form of 
malware goes unfixed, or without a “patch” it is referred to as “in the 
wild.”71 As long as malware remains in the wild, people stay vulnerable to 
attack until an antidote, or a “patch” is created.  
The FBI has used a wide variety of terminology to refer to its own 
hacking operations,72 opposed to associations with malware and hacking 
because both activities suggest that the activity is unlawful.73 To this end, 
the government has maintained that its operations are court sanctioned 
and therefore different.74 However, a Network Investigative Technique 
(“NIT”), by practical definition, is a form of malware because it is 
designed to gain access to one’s computer without one’s consent to do so. 
Semantics aside, the government is able to surreptitiously infiltrate one’s 
computer remotely, frequently without adequate oversight from the 
courts.75 It is estimated that the FBI has used malware for almost two 
decades76 but the way the malware is deployed has changed over time as 
a result of Tor and other technology designed to mask one’s identity and 
location online.77  
 
 65. The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/pages/playpen-cases-frequently-asked-questions (last visited May 7, 2018). 
 66. Spyware is surreptitiously installed onto a victim’s device to collect that victim’s information. 
See Tim Fisher, What Is Malware?, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/ 
what-is-malware-153600 (last updated Jan. 16, 2018).  
 67. Ransomware locks a victim’s device and prevents access to one’s data or threatens to delete 
or release that data unless a ransom is paid. See Hacker Lexicon: A Guide to Ransomware, the Scary 
Hack That’s on the Rise, WIRED (Feb. 9, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/ 
video/hacker-lexicon-a-guide-to-ransomware-the-scary-hack-that-s-on-the-rise. 
 68. A keylogger is malware clandestinely installed onto one’s device to monitor and log one’s 
keystrokes then send that information to the attacker. See Mary Landesman, Examples of the Most 
Damaging Malware, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/most-damaging-malware-153602 (last 
updated June 2, 2017). 
 69. Computer viruses are programs that, not unlike regular viruses, spread from computer to 
computer. See Anne W. Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programs and Computer Rogues: Tailoring 
the Punishment to Fit the Crime, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 60 (1990). 
 70. The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65. 
 71. Fisher, supra note 66. 
 72. For a list of these terms, see Mayer, supra note 40, at 575 n.16. 
 73. Mayer, supra note 40, at 575 n.16 (explaining the government’s opposition to NITs’ 
associations with malware or hacking).  
 74. Decl. of Dr. Christopher Soghoian, United States v. Matish, No. 4:16-cr-00016, at 3 n.9 (E.D. 
Va. June 10, 2016). 
 75. Government Hacking and Subversion of Digital Security, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
https://www.eff.org/issues/government-hacking-digital-security (last visited May 7, 2018). 
 76. Andrew Crocker, With Remote Hacking, the Government’s Particularity Problem Isn’t Going 
Away, JUST SECURITY (June 2, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/31365/remote-hacking-
governments-particularity-problem-isnt/. 
 77. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
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B. THE EARLY DAYS: CARNIVORE, KLS, AND MAGIC LANTERN  
Since at least the 1990s, the United States has used computer 
surveillance tools in its investigations. The first known tool used by the 
FBI was a “network sniffer”78 and diagnostic tool dubbed “Carnivore.”79 
With the permission of ISPs, the government installed Carnivore onto 
“network backbones”80 to target individuals and collect data authorized 
by wiretap orders.81 The hardware component which operated the 
Carnivore system required physical installation at the ISP of that targeted 
individual.82 The public did not learn about Carnivore until 2000 when 
Earthlink, an ISP, refused to allow the FBI to install it on its network.83 
The FBI has since discontinued its use of Carnivore in favor of 
commercial products.84 
In 1999, the FBI worked around the problems imposed by 
encryption by using a keylogger program85 called the Keystroke Logger 
System (“KLS”) to capture a password.86 The KLS recorded and 
monitored all keystrokes entered onto a computer so long as the 
computer’s modem was not in use.87 Pursuant to two warrants, the FBI 
physically installed KLS multiple times onto the computer of mobster 
Nicodemo S. Scarfo.88 The KLS was apparently necessary to the success 
of the government’s investigation into Scarfo because of Scarfo used 
 
 78. A network sniffer works by monitoring data transmitted over a computer network in real time. 
See Bradley Mitchell, What Is a Network Sniffer?, LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/ 
definition-of-sniffer-817996 (last updated Aug. 24, 2017). 
 79. Kim Zetter, Everything We Know About How the FBI Hacks People, WIRED (May 15, 2016, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/history-fbis-hacking/. 
 80. Network backbones are utilized to enable network traffic and “consist of network 
routers and switches connected mainly by fiber optic cables” used by ISPs and large organizations. 
Bradley Mitchell, What Internet and Network Backbones Do, LIFEWIRE, 
https://www.lifewire.com/definition-of-backbone-817777 (last visited May 7, 2018). 
 81. Nathan E. Carrell, Spying on the Mob: United States v. ScarfoA Constitutional Analysis, 
2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 193, 197 (2002). 
 82. Brent Dean, Carnivores and Magic Lanterns: The New World of Electronic Surveillance,  
3 COMPUTER CRIME & TECH. LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2007). 
 83. Zetter, supra note 79 (“Earthlink feared the sniffer would give the feds unfettered access to 
all customer communications. A court battle and congressional hearing ensued, which sparked a fierce 
and divisive debate, making Carnivore the Apple/FBI case of its day.”).  
 84. See Zetter, supra note 79. 
 85. For a description of keyloggers, see Landesman, supra note 68.  
 86. Declan McCullagh, How Far Can FBI Spying Go?, WIRED (July 31, 2001, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2001/07/how-far-can-fbi-spying-go/. 
 87. See United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 581–82 (D.N.J. 2001). By only recording 
when the modem was not in use, the FBI avoided triggering Title III protections as Title III warrants 
are only required when capturing statutorily defined oral, electronic, or wire communications. See 
Carrell, supra note 81, at 198. 
 88. See Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d. at 574 (“This case presents an interesting issue of first impression 
dealing with the ever-present tension between individual privacy and liberty rights and law 
enforcement’s use of new and advanced technology to vigorously investigate criminal activity.”). 
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Pretty Good Privacy (“PGP”)89 software to encrypt a file on his computer 
entitled “Factors.”90 The FBI obtained a warrant in order to obtain the 
password to decrypt the software and access the file, believing the file 
contained information pertaining to Scarfo’s illegal gambling and 
loansharking operation.91  
Scarfo’s defense made several points in its arguments to suppress 
evidence obtained through the KLSnamely that the warrant was void 
as a general warrant;92 and the installation of the KLS amounted to a 
wiretap subject to Title III protections.93 The court rejected both 
arguments.94 Scarfo’s defense became more complicated when he 
pursued information about the keylogger.95 The government filed a 
motion under the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”), 
insisting that the technology at issue “was classified for national security 
reasons.”96 Along with other things, CIPA allows for the government to 
redact certain information and provide non-classified summaries in its 
place as a part of discovery.97 This move was successful for the 
government, and the KLS was never disclosed.98 
In 2001, it came to light that the FBI developed a software version 
of KLS named “Magic Lantern.”99 Unlike its predecessor, Magic Lantern 
could be remotely installed via a computer virus.100 This remote access 
search technique101 had the ability to record keystrokes in addition to 
emailing data back to law enforcement.102 Magic Lantern is believed to 
 
 89. PGP is encryption software created by Philip Zimmerman in the 1990s utilizing a two-key 
system which requires a passphrase to encrypt and a passphrase to decrypt. Carrell, supra note 81, at 
193, 196; see Kessler, supra note 39 (explaining the process of using PGP).  
 90. See Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d. at 574, 581. 
 91. Id.  
 92. See Declan McCullagh, Feds Use Keylogger to Thwart PGP, Hushmail, CNET (July 20, 2007, 
10:41 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/feds-use-keylogger-to-thwart-pgp-hushmail/. 
 93. See Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 576; SAYAKO QUINLAN & ANDI WILSON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT HACKING IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2016) (“[I]n a two-year pretrial court fight, Scarfo 
challenged the legality of using the key logging software, claiming that the tool was akin to wiretapping 
and that the FBI had not obtained the proper warrant for its use.”).  
 94. See Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 576, 581. 
 95. Zetter, supra note 79. 
 96. Zetter, supra note 79 (“[I]t’s one of the same excuses the government uses today to keep a veil 
over its surveillance tools and techniques”). 
 97. See Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 579.  
 98. Id. at 583 (“CIPA strikes a balance between national security interests and a criminal 
defendant’s right to discovery by allowing for a summary which meets the defendant’s discovery 
needs.”). 
 99. Zetter, supra note 79 (“The Scarfo case evidently convinced the feds that they needed to 
develop their own custom hacking tools . . . .”). 
 100. Carrell, supra note 81, at 198, 199. 
 101. See Zach Lerner, A Warrant to Hack: An Analysis of the Proposed Amendments to Rule  
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 26, 39–40 (2016) (explaining 
how remote access tools work). 
 102. Carrell, supra note 81, at 199. 
AUCOIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2018  1:31 PM 
June 2018] THE SPIDER'S PARLOR 1445 
be the software used in the first known instance of the government 
hacking remotely, taking place in early 2003.103 The FBI’s investigation 
into six animal activistscalled “Operation Trail Mix”centered upon 
the actions of the U.S.-based branch of an organization dedicated to 
shutting down Huntingdon Life Sciences, a research firm that utilized 
animal product testing.104 Again, the FBI found itself thwarted by the 
group’s use of PGP software in masking its online communications and 
attempted to get around the encryption by obtaining a wiretap order to 
intercept the group’s computers.105  
C. PHISHING, AND WATERING HOLE ATTACKS  
In 2007, Timberline High School of Lacey, Washington, was subject 
to nine bomb threats106 sent from an anonymous sourcevia a 
handwritten note, emails, and through a Myspace page called 
“Timberlinebombinfo.”107 The FBI turned to Google and Myspace to 
track down the hoaxer, however, the culprit masked his identity so that 
it appeared the threats were coming from Italy or the Czech Republic.108 
Because of these threats, and the wrongdoer’s use of anonymizing 
software, the FBI filed for authorization of a search warrant to install 
malware called Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier 
(“CIPAV”) onto any device accessing the Timberlinebombinfo Myspace 
account.109 The FBI used a popular form of hacking known as 
“phishing”110 which entails impersonating a non-threatening and 
trustworthy website or the like then tempting a victim to click on a link 
 
 103. Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Used Hacking Software Decade Before iPhone Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/technology/fbi-tried-to-defeat-encryption-10-
years-ago-files-show.html?_r=0. 
 104. See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 138 (3d Cir. 2009); Zetter, supra note 69. 
 105. Apuzzo, supra note 103. 
 106. See Mayer, supra note 40, at 574; Raphael Satter, How a School Bomb-Scare Case Sparked 
a Media-vs.-FBI Fight, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 18, 2017, 3:03 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/ 
best-states/washington/articles/2017-03-18/how-a-school-bomb-scare-case-sparked-a-media-vs-
fbi-fight (“Each time a threat came in, the school would be emptied. Each time, nothing happened.”). 
 107. See Brian L. Owsley, Beware of Government Agents Bearing Trojan Horses, 48 AKRON L. 
REV. 315, 324–27 (2015) (describing the events of the Timberline High School bomb threats in detail).  
 108. Satter, supra note 106 (“The hacker had broken into the servers and used them to throw 
investigators off. He could have been hiding anywhere . . . [the hacker, 15 years old at the time] relied 
largely on two or three servers that he had penetrated from his home computer. He typically emailed 
his threats between the time his parents left for work and when he took the bus to school.”).  
 109. Owsley, supra note 107, at 316, 325. 
 110. See Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Is Phishing?, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2015, 6:09 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/04/hacker-lexicon-spear-phishing/:  
Phishing refers to malicious emails that are designed to trick the recipient into clicking on 
a malicious attachment or visiting a malicious web site. Spear-phishing is a more targeted 
form of phishing that appears to come from a trusted acquaintance . . . An estimated 91-
percent of hacking attacks begin with a phishing or spear-phishing email.  
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or a document which then infiltrates the victim’s computer with 
malware.111 Banking on the conceit of the hoaxer, an FBI agent messaged 
the Myspace account pretending to be a reporter sending links to an 
article he was compiling.112 When the suspect clicked on the link, CIPAV 
ran on his computer, relaying his IP address back to the FBI.113 Once the 
FBI obtained the IP address, agents could subpoena the ISP for the 
subscriber’s information.114 From there, the FBI was able to secure the 
identity of the teen behind the threats and quickly arrested him hours 
after he clicked on the malicious link.115 
Another law enforcement hacking technique is the “watering hole 
attack,”116 also known as a “drive-by-download,” which works so that 
anyone who visits a website infected with malware is then infected.117 
This tool is ideal in situations where the hidden services on the dark web 
contain contraband, like that of child pornography, which is illegal to 
seek out or view. There are three known federal investigations to date 
that used this watering hole attack on the dark web: (1) “Operation 
Torpedo” in 2012; (2) the take down of Freedom Hosting servers in 2013; 
and (3) “Operation Pacifier” in 2015.118 It is estimated that these 
investigations resulted in a collective hacking of thousands of computers 
from around the world.119 
The first time the FBI has had to publicly defend its watering hole 
tactic was with “Operation Torpedo.”120 In Operation Torpedo, 
 
 111. Jenna McLaughlin, The Big Secret That Makes the FBI’s Anti-Encryption Campaign a Big 
Lie, INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2015, 7:47 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/09/28/hacking/.  
 112. See Satter, supra note 106 (detailing the use of the AP website and FBI agent pretending to 
be a reporter to catch the person behind the Timberline High school bomb threats).  
 113. Satter, supra note 106. 
 114. Lerner, supra note 101, at 39. 
 115. McLaughlin, supra note 111. Two days after the culprit’s sentencing, Wired broke the story 
that the FBI used the CIPAV software. See Kevin Poulsen, FBI’s Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen 
Who Made Bomb Threats, WIRED (July 8, 2007, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/07/ 
fbi-spyware/. From there, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a Freedom of Information Act 
request to access all documents pertaining to the program. See Endpoint Surveillance Tools (CIPAV), 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/foia/foia-endpoint-surveillance-tools-cipav (last visited 
May 7, 2018). While the documents received were heavily redacted, the EFF had enough to determine 
the variety of information that was collected from a target’s computer once the CIPAV is installed onto 
it, and to determine that the FBI “and likely other federal agencieshave used this tool a lot.” Jennifer 
Lynch, New FBI Documents Provide Details on Government’s Surveillance Spyware, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/new-fbi-
documents-show-depth-government. 
 116. “The term derives from the concept of poisoning a watering hole where certain animals are 
known to drink.” AM. C.L. UNION FOUND. ET AL., CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT HACKING IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 1 (2017). 
 117. McLaughlin, supra note 111. 
 118. See Mayer, supra note 40, at 584–85.  
 119. Mayer, supra note 40, at 585. 
 120. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
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authorities in the Netherlands benefited from the lack of precaution of 
the administrator of a hidden service called “Pedo Board.”121 This 
individual left his administrative account open without a password so the 
agents were able to access the account and trace the server’s IP address 
to Nebraska.122 They then passed the information along to the FBI.123 The 
FBI traced the IP address to Aaron McGrath, who operated three servers 
hosting child pornography.124 The FBI spent a year investigating 
McGrath until finally arresting him and seizing his servers.125 A federal 
magistrate issued three search warrants sanctioning the FBI to install 
malware onto the hidden service and deploy NITs on any computers 
which visited it.126 The FBI deployed the NIT by utilizing a vulnerability 
in the Adobe Flash Player plugin for the Tor Browser.127 The NIT was only 
authorized to collect specific information on these computers.128 Once 
the IP addresses of these computers were identified, the law enforcement 
subpoenaed the ISPs to obtain the subscriber’s names and home 
addresses, and used this information to apply for further search warrants 
then execute cross-country arrests.129 
In 2013, the government performed another take down of child 
pornography on the dark web with an unnamed operation against 
“Freedom Hosting” servers, a large and unidentified provider hosting Tor 
hidden servicesmany of which were contraband.130 Eric Eoin 
Marquesan American born Irishmanwas living in Dublin, Ireland in 
July 2013 when he was arrested by Irish authorities.131 Marques, in 
running the Freedom Hosting servers, is believed to be the biggest 
 
 121. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 122. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 123. Poulsen, supra note 48.  
 124. Poulsen, supra note 48.  
 125. Poulsen, supra note 48.  
 126. Poulsen, supra note 48.  
 127. See Response & Request to Strike Defendant’s Request for Daubert Motion, U.S. v. Cottom, 
No. 8:13-cr-00108-JFB-TDT, at 5 (D. Neb. June 29, 2015):  
[T]he [NIT] utilized a Flash application that, when downloaded by a user and activated by 
their browser, made a direct TCP connection to a server that the FBI controlled. Depending 
on the operating system and version of the user’s browser, the connection would bypass the 
browser’s configured proxy server and reveal the user’s true IP address. 
 128. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 129. Poulsen, supra note 48.  
 130. Poulsen, supra note 48 (Freedom Hosting is said to have, “by some estimates, powered half 
of the Dark Net.”).  
 131. The U.S. was granted its request for extradition of Eric Eoin Marques in December 2015. High 
Court Grants Extradition of Irishman to US in Porn Case, RAIDIÓ TEILIFÍS ÉIREANN (Dec. 15, 2015, 
4:50 PM), https://www.rte.ie/news/ireland/2015/1216/754065-eric-eoin-marques/. Marques appeal 
of the extradition order was denied in December, 2016. Man Loses Extradition Challenge in Child 
Abuse Images Case, RAIDIÓ TEILIFÍS ÉIREANN (Dec. 12, 2016, 5:37 PM), 
https://www.rte.ie/news/2016/1212/838362-eric-eoin-marques/. 
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facilitator of child pornography in the world, who earned thousands of 
dollars on a monthly basis for his facilitation.132 The FBI worked with 
French authorities to gain control over Freedom Hosting servers located 
in France and was able to relocate these servers to Maryland by cloning 
them.133 Shortly thereafter, some Tor users noticed that sites on Freedom 
Hosting’s servers “were serving a hidden ‘iframe’a kind of website 
within a website.”134 As it turns out, this iframe housed malicious code 
which used a vulnerability in the Tor browser through Mozilla Firefox to 
deploy malware.135 This code specifically targeted the first Tor browser 
exploit found in the wild in order to gather the target computer’s IP 
address, media access control (“MAC”) address, and computer’s host 
name.136 The code enabled a program on one’s computer which 
invalidated the anonymity offered by the Tor browser.137 In the process 
of attempting to apprehend those accessing illegal contraband, the 
government’s code is believed to have indiscriminately attacked 
potentially innocent users of an email service known as TorMail.138 The 
FBI failed to inform any of the users on TorMailwhose identities the 
FBI never subpoenaedthat their computers were compromised by the 
attack.139 This resulted in vulnerability to anyone who had not yet 
updated their Tor browser bundle with the latest patch. It also leaves 
unresolved questions as to whether the FBI should or is required to 
inform people in similar situations if their computers are compromised 
by the government without probable cause for criminal activity. 
III.  OPERATION PACIFICER: THE “PLAYPEN” CASES  
A. THE WARRANT DEPLOYED AROUND THE WORLD 
In early 2015, the FBI seized the server of a child pornography 
hidden service known as “Playpen.”140 The FBI became aware of Playpen 
 
 132. See Graham Templeton, The US Is Trying to Extradite a Notorious Dark Web Admin This 
Week, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (May 11, 2015, 7:45 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/ 
article/the-us-is-trying-to-extradite-a-notorious-dark-web-admin-this-week; IrishCentral Staff 
Writers, FBI Most Wanted Pornographer Eric Eoin Marques Lived a Quiet Life, IRISHCENTRAL (Aug. 
26, 2013, 5:12 AM), https://www.irishcentral.com/news/fbi-most-wanted-pornographer-eric-eoin-
marques-lived-a-quiet-life-221143181-237772251. 
 133. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 134. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 135. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 136. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 137. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 138. McLaughlin, supra note 111. 
 139. McLaughlin, supra note 111.  
 140. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Florida Man Convicted of Engaging in Child Exploitation 
Enterprise (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-man-convicted-engaging-child-
exploitation-enterprise. 
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in December 2014 when it received a tip from a foreign agency that the 
temporarily visible IP address of the server was in the U.S.141 The FBI 
then investigated and obtained a search warrant for the home of the 
person associated with that IP address and seized the server hosting 
Playpen.142 The catalyst of the operationdubbed “Operation 
Pacifier”began when the FBI arrested Stephen Chase, the creator and 
co-administer of Playpen, and seized his server from his home in 
Florida.143 Controversially, instead of shutting Playpen down, the FBI 
obtained a warrant and ran the site from their servers in Virginia for 
almost two weeks after apprehending Chase.144 While this was not the 
first time the FBI seized then ran websites hosting child pornography, it 
marked the public’s first time knowing about it.145  
Operation Pacifier also attracted more controversy than its 
predecessors because a single warrant led to an estimated collection of IP 
addresses ranging somewhere in the thousands,146 at least 350 domestic 
arrests, and over 135 cases nationwide (“Playpen cases”).147 In February 
2015, U.S. Magistrate Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan of the Eastern 
District of Virginia, issued a search warrant (“NIT Warrant”) which 
authorized the FBI to deploy a NIT on any person’s computer who logged 
into Playpen regardless of where they logged in from.148 The NIT 
Warrant enabled the FBI to hack over 8000 computers149 and authorized 
 
 141. The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65. 
 142. The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65. 
 143. In May 2017, Chase was sentenced to thirty years in federal prison for his horrific crimes. 
‘Playpen’ Creator Sentenced to 30 Years, FBI NEWS (May 5, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/news/ 
stories/playpen-creator-sentenced-to-30-years. 
 144. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Barre Resident Sentenced to Prison for Possession of Child 
Pornography (Oct. 16, 2017) (“The FBI did not shut down the Website for approximately  
13 days.”). 
 145. When the warrant application was unsealed, it was unearthed that the FBI requested 
authorization to run all twenty-three of elicit hidden service websites hosted by Freedom Hosting from 
a government facility in Maryland for thirty days. See Affidavit ISO Application for Search Warrant, 
In the Matter of the Search of Computers that Access “Websites 1-23”, No. 13-17440 (D. Md. Oct. 13, 
2016). 
 146. See Bellovin, supra note 38, at n.152. 
 147. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Shelby County Man Sentenced for Possessing Child 
Pornography (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/shelby-county-man-sentenced-
possessing-child-pornography (“As a result of the investigation, at least 350 U.S.-based individuals 
have been arrested, 25 producers of child pornography have been prosecuted, 51 alleged hands-on 
abusers have been prosecuted and 55 American children who were subjected to sexual abuse have been 
successfully identified or rescued.”). 
 148. In the Matter of the Search of Computers that Access upf45jvbziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89 
(E.D. Va Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter NIT Warrant].  
 149. See Joseph Cox, The FBI Hacked over 8,000 Computers in 120 Countries Based on One 
Warrant, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 22, 2016, 3:18 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
en_us/article/fbi-hacked-over-8000-computers-in-120-countries-based-on-one-warrant; Joseph 
Cox, Court Docs Confirm FBI’s Child Porn Hack Was International, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (May 17, 
2016, 3:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/court-docs-confirm-fbis-child-porn-
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the FBI to deploy a NIT on the server operating Playpen in order to obtain 
information from anyone who accessed the hidden service.150 In each 
Playpen case, the FBI used the information obtained from the NIT to 
obtainamong other thingsthe Tor user’s masked IP address.151 The 
FBI then used the captured IP address to obtain a subpoena from the 
associated ISP.152 Finally, the identifying information from the subpoena, 
NIT, and the evidence collected from investigations into the user 
associated with the IP address was used to obtain a residential warrant 
from the appropriate judicial district to search the home of the 
defendant.153 
The FBI refers to this investigation as the FBI’s most fruitful 
operation against criminal activity on the dark web to date.154 As of 
February 1, 2018, there are over 200 cases in the United States resulting 
from the NIT Warrant.155 Of information available, a total of forty-six 
U.S. defendants have either pleaded guilty or have been found guilty for 
various federal charges under the Child Protection Act.156 Of the at least 
seventy attorneys, and some thirty legal teams across the country known 
to be working on the Playpen cases, some have chosen to combine their 
efforts in a “national working group.”157 A minority of four cases were 
 
hack-was-international (“According to a Europol presentation, the agency has generated 3,229 cases 
as part of the operation covering Playpen.”). 
 150. The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65.  
 151. Specifically, the NIT Warrant authorized the collection of the target computer’s host name, 
operating system, IP address, MAC address, as well as other information. See NIT Warrant, supra note 
148, at 6–7. For an explanation on how the NIT itself worked, see Susan Hennessey & Nicholas 
Weaver, A Judicial Framework for Evaluating Network Investigative Techniques, LAWFARE BLOG 
(July 28, 2016, 10:17 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/judicial-framework-evaluating-network-
investigative-techniques (explaining how the “distinct components” of “generator,” “exploit,” 
“payload,” and “logging server” worked to circumvent the anonymity afforded by Tor).  
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 229 F. Supp. 3d 647, 650–51 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (describing 
the subpoena process in the Playpen cases). 
 153. See The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65 (“Once the FBI obtained 
an IP address from the NIT’s transmissions, it served subpoenas on [ISPs] to learn the names and 
addresses associated with that IP address. The FBI then obtained warrants to search and seize 
evidence associated with child pornography at those locations.”). 
 154. See Playpen Creator Sentenced to 30 Years, supra note 143. 
 155. See Leslie R. Caldwell, Ensuring Tech-Savvy Criminals Do Not Have Immunity from 
Investigation, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/ 
ensuring-tech-savvy-criminals-do-not-have-immunity-investigation.  
 156. This number is based on a search of federal dockets on Bloomberg Law as of February  
1, 2018. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, No. 3:15-cr-00414 (D. Or. filed Nov. 19, 2015) (sentenced 
to twenty-five years in prison followed by supervised release for life), Dkt. Nos. 76, 88; United States 
v. Henderson, No. 3:15-cr-00565 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 1, 2016) (sentenced to five years in prison 
followed by ten years of supervised release), Dkt. Nos. 70, 83. 
 157. See Joseph Cox, Dozens of Lawyers Across the US Fight the FBI’s Mass Hacking Campaign, 
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (July 27, 2016, 9:15 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/ 
article/dozens-of-lawyers-across-the-us-fight-the-fbis-mass-hacking-campaign-playpen (“The 
group . . . has a Dropbox-like system for sharing material, and a lively Google discussion group. They 
inform each other of developments, exchange legal documents, and basically help each other out with 
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dismissed by three district courts following grants of suppression 
motions, but each decision has since been reversed on appeal by the First, 
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.158 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the denial of suppression in a defendant’s appeal.159 At least four cases 
were dismissed by motion of the government because of discovery orders 
unfavorable to the government, unclear reasons, or as a result of deaths 
of defendants.160 
To date, the Playpen defendants and government prosecution teams 
have adopted similar arguments and counter arguments regarding the 
validity of the NIT Warrant and all the information subsequently 
gathered as a result of its authorization.161 The Playpen defendants have 
argued motions for dismissal of their indictments based on “outrageous 
government conduct;” motions to suppress all evidence based on 
unconstitutionality and insufficiency of the NIT Warrant; and motions to 
compel discovery of the source code deployed by the NIT.162  
B. GOING THROUGH THE MOTIONS: DISMISSAL, SUPPRESSION, AND 
DISCLOSURE  
1.   Motions to Dismiss for Outrageous Government Conduct  
Some of the Playpen defendants called for dismissal of their 
indictments based on the argument that the FBI’s conduct, in hosting 
 
their cases.”). The ACLU Foundation, EFF, and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
collaborated to create a resource detailing legal strategies for defense attorneys to utilize to even the 
playing field against the government in hacking cases. See Lerner, supra note 101. 
 158. See United States v. Levin, No. 15-CR-10271, 2016 WL 2596010 (D. Mass. May  
5, 2016), rev’d, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1269 
(D. Colo. 2016), rev’d, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Croghan (and Horton), Nos. 15-
CR-48, 15-CR-51, 2016 WL 4992105 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 19, 2016), rev’d, United States v. Horton, 863 
F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017). Some of these defendants have filed for writs of certiorari before the 
Supreme Court. See Horton v. United States, No. 17-6910 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2017); Workman v. United 
States, No. 17-7042 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2017). 
 159. See, e.g., United States v. McLamb, No. 17-4299, 2018 WL 541851, at *3–4 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(agreeing with the findings of its “sister circuits” that suppression is not an appropriate remedy).  
 160. See United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB (W.D. Wash. filed July 23, 2015), Dkt. 
No. 227 (dismissed after a lengthy discovery battle resulted in a choice between disclosure of the NIT’s 
source code or dropping the case); United States v. Dzwonczyk, No. 4:15-cr-03134 (D. Neb. filed Jan. 
3, 2017), Dkt. No. 78 (dismissed following defendant’s death); United States v. Kneitel, No. 8:16-cr-
00023 (M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 14, 2016), Dkt. Nos. 201–202 (dismissed following guilty verdict after 
defendant’s death); United States v. Arterbury, No. 4:15-cr-00182 (N.D. Okla. filed Nov. 10, 2016), 
Dkt. No. 67 (dismissed for unclear reasons). 
 161. Cox, supra note 157 (summarizing the two chief defense strategies adopted nationwide: (1) 
suppression of evidence from the NIT Warrant, and (2) disclosure of the full NIT source code). 
 162. Cox, supra note 157. 
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Playpen, was “so outrageous”163 as to require dismissal.164 The argument 
is based on the fact that in the thirteen days that the FBI hosted Playpen 
as a part of its investigation, “visitors to the site accessed, posted or 
traded at least 48,000 images, 200 videos and 13,000 links to child 
pornography.”165 It is maintained that the FBI went entirely against the 
Department of Justice’s assertion that each time a pornographic image 
of a child is distributed or viewed, that child is re-victimized.166 
Ultimately, courts found the argument unpersuasive when weighed 
against the dire situation posed by the availability of exploitation 
material online.167 To illustrate, Playpen had some 60,000 member 
accounts only a month after launching and 215,000 within a year of that 
time, with over 10,000 new visitors each week.168 As important as it was 
to take Playpen down, one of the problems encountered by law 
enforcement is that taking down one site will not prevent more from 
popping up in its place.169 Thus far, courts faced with these dismissal 
motions have recognized that the government was faced with a difficult 
choice and ultimately, its experts concluded that the best way to 
apprehend offenders and protect victims was to run the server for a 
limited amount of time.170 As FBI Special Agent Dan Alfin said, “[i]t’s a 
cat-and-mouse game, except it’s not a game. Kids are being abused, and 
it’s our job to stop that.”171 When requests for dismissals of charges are 
rejected, the next point of attack is the evidence behind those charges. 
 
 163. Outrageous government conduct occurs where “the conduct of law enforcement agents is so 
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial 
processes to obtain a conviction.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973).  
 164. See, e.g., Mot. & Memo ISO Mot. to Dismiss Indictment, U.S. v. Tippens, 2:15-cr-00274-RJB, 
at 6, 9 (Aug. 22, 2016), Dkt. No. 95 (arguing that “[i]t is no answer that the FBI did this as part of an 
effort to apprehend people. That end does not (and was never going to) justify the means.”). 
 165. Mike Carter, FBI’s Massive Porn Sting Puts Internet Privacy in Crossfire, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Aug. 27, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/fbis-massive-porn-
sting-puts-internet-privacy-in-crossfire/.  
 166. Id.  
 167. See, e.g., United States v. Schreiber, No. 15-CR-377 (ENV), 2018 WL 276347, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 3, 2018) (“[E]ven assuming there were alternative methods available, the government, in any 
event, is entitled to weigh the relative costs and benefits of the available array of investigatory 
approaches without being subject to judicial second guessing.”). 
 168. Joseph Cox, The FBI’s ‘Unprecedented’ Hacking Campaign Targeted over a Thousand 
Computers, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 5, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/read/ 
the-fbis-unprecedented-hacking-campaign-targeted-over-a-thousand-computers. 
 169. See discussion supra Part II.B.  
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Vortman, No. 16-cr-00210-teh-1, 2016 WL 7324987, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 16, 2016) (accepting the government’s decision to run Playpen for a limited time in order to 
identify wrongdoers and help victims from further abuse).  
 171. Playpen Creator Sentenced to 30 Years, supra note 143. 
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2.   Motions to Suppress Evidence from the NIT Warrant  
The two main arguments to suppress evidence obtained from the 
NIT Warrant center on challenges to the warrant’s sufficiency under the 
Fourth Amendment and under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.172 First, defendants argue that the NIT Warrant fails to meet 
the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of probable cause and 
particularity.173 Second, they reason that Magistrate Judge Buchanan did 
not have authority to authorize the NIT Warrant under Rule 41(b). Apart 
from four outliers,174 courts across the country have denied the motions 
to suppress.175 The various results of the suppression motions can be 
narrowed into four main categories. First, the NIT Warrant violated Rule 
41(b), deployment of the NIT amounted to a warrantless search, and all 
evidence obtained from the NIT or subsequent warrants pursuant to the 
NIT must be suppressed.176 Second, the NIT Warrant violated Rule 41(b), 
however, suppression of evidence was inappropriate based on: (1) 
technical violation; (2) good faith exception to the exclusionary rule; or 
(3) the exigent circumstances exception to a warrantless search.177 Third, 
the NIT Warrant did not violate Rule 41(b) because it was authorized 
under either Rule 41(b)(1), Rule 41(b)(2), or Rule 41(b)(4).178 Fourth, the 
NIT Warrant did not violate Rule 41(b), but even if it had, suppression of 
evidence would be unwarranted.179 
The Fourth Amendment establishes that all warrants must be issued 
“upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
 
 172. See, e.g., Unites States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-RJB, 2016 BL 446405, at *6 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 30, 2016) (addressing challenges based on probable cause and Rule 41). 
 173. See, e.g., Vortman, 2016 WL 7324987, at *6 (finding the NIT Warrant failed on both probable 
cause and particularity grounds). 
 174. See supra note 158. 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1222–23 (N.D. Ala. 2017): 
As of [April 24, 2017], at least 44 district courts have ruled on motions to suppress the 
information seized pursuant to the NIT warrant. Twelve of these courts have found that the 
warrant did not violate § 636(a) of the Federal Magistrates Act and/or Rule 41 . . . Twenty-
two district courts have found that the warrant did violate § 636(a) and/or Rule 41(b), but 
that the violation did not warrant suppression. . . . [Six] have declined to decide whether the 
statute and/or the Rule authorized the warrant but found that exclusion was unwarranted 
regardless. . . . Four courts have suppressed the evidence. 
 176. See supra note 158. 
 177. See, e.g., United States v. Perdue, 237 F. Supp. 3d 471, 478 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2017) (finding 
the Rule 41 violation in authorizing the NIT Warrant to be technical, rather than constitutional); 
United States v. Allen. No. 15-CR-620, 2017 WL 6397728, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017) (concluding 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule appropriate). 
 178. See, e.g., United States v. Jean, No. 5:15-cr-50087, 2016 WL 4771096, at *13 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 
13, 2016) (holding the NIT to amount to a “tracking device” under Rule 41(b)(4)).  
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Epich, No. 15-CR-163-PP, 2016 WL 953269, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 
14, 2016) (“Suppression of evidence is rarely, if ever, the remedy for a violation of Rule 41, even if such 
a violation has occurred.”). 
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particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized.’”180 Courts utilize a totality of the circumstances 
test181 to determine whether there is probable cause by considering if 
there is a “fair probability” that evidence or contraband will be found in 
a particular place law enforcement seeks to search.182 So far, defense 
attorneys183 have failed in their efforts to convince courts that their 
clients logged onto Playpen without the intention to view child 
pornography (the triggering event of probable cause being logging onto 
Playpen which clearly hosts child pornography).184 Courts have not 
accepted this argument, turning to the extreme unlikelihood of a user 
simply stumbling upon the page, much less, creating a username and 
logging on given the multiple affirmative steps required.185 Defendants 
also argued the NIT Warrant did not meet the particularity requirement 
because it did not provide how Playpen “‘unabashedly announce[d]’ that 
it was an illegal child pornography site”186 and because the logo on the 
first screen on Playpen described in the application was different from 
the one on the website when the NIT was deployed.187 The view of most 
courts regarding these arguments can be summed up as: (1) the NIT 
Warrant was based on sufficient probable cause because the magistrate 
judge permissibly relied upon the FBI’s conclusions that evidence of 
criminal activity was likely to be found; and (2) that the homepage image 
changed between when the FBI wrote its affidavit and when the NIT was 
deployed is immaterial to the underlying FBI conclusion because both 
images represented child pornography.188  
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 41(b), with limited 
exceptions, empowers federal magistrate judges with the authority to 
issue warrants within the judicial district the magistrate is in.189 In the 
Playpen cases, the NIT Warrant authorized searches of computers 
 
 180. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 181. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).  
 182. United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-RJB, 2016 BL 446405, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 
30, 2016) (citing United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 183. See Cox, supra note 157. 
 184. See Transcript of Motions Hearing at 14, United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 22, 2016) (arguing that it is debatable whether the photo on the homepage of 
Playpen when the NIT was deployed was “lascivious” enough to indicate the content of the website as 
child pornography) [hereinafter Transcript of Motions Hearing]. 
 185. See, e.g., United States v. Vortman, No. 16-cr-00210-TEH-1, 2016 WL 7324987, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 16, 2016) (describing the multiple affirmative steps that had to be taken to access Playpen). 
 186. Tippens, 2016 BL 446405, at *6. 
 187. Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note 184, at 14 (arguing that the application for the NIT 
warrant described a different logo than that present when the NIT was deployed so the warrant failed 
for particularity). 
 188. See, e.g., Tippens, 2016 BL 446405, at *6–9 (addressing each point). 
 189. The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65. 
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beyond the magistrate judge’s own district, the Eastern District of 
Virginia.190 The government has defended the NIT Warrant on the 
grounds that it was authorized under either Rule 41(b)(1), Rule 41(b)(2), 
or Rule 41(b)(4). Though nationwide prosecutions have produced 
differing opinions,191 courts have generally come to one of three 
conclusions: (1) suppression is required because the NIT warrant was 
unlawfully issued;192 (2) despite unlawful issuance of the NIT warrant, 
suppression is not the appropriate remedy;193 or (3) suppression is not 
required because the NIT warrant was lawfully issued.194 Each of the 
court orders granting suppression of evidence have been reversed on 
appeal so far.195 Most courts have found the NIT Warrant violated Rule 
41(b), but suppression of evidence would not be appropriate because: (1) 
the violation was technical; (2) the good faith exception applies; or (3) 
otherwise the exigency of harm caused by Playpen’s operation.196  
A Rule 41 violation can be substantive and constitutional or 
technical and procedural in nature.197 If a court finds the NIT Warrant 
violates Rule 41, it has to consider whether that violation amounts to a 
fundamental erroras in a “clear constitutional [violation] warrant[ing] 
suppression”198or a technical error “warrant[ing] suppression only if: 
(1) there is evidence of deliberate disregard of the rule, or (2) the 
defendants were prejudiced by the error.”199 The Playpen defendants 
argued the violation amounted to a constitutional level of “the cyber 
equivalent of the general warrants that were anathema to the 
Founders.”200 Specifically the argument is that the violation is 
constitutional in nature because the NIT enabled a warrantless search of 
their computers.201 The government argues that even if the NIT Warrant 
 
 190. The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65. 
 191. United States v. Dzwonczyk, No. 4:15-cr-03134, 2016 WL 7428390, at *6 (D. Neb. Dec. 23, 2016). 
 192. See supra note 158. 
 193. See supra note 159. 
 194. See, e.g., United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593 (E.D. Va. Jun. 3, 2016) (“[A]ny 
potential defects in the issuance of the warrant or in the warrant itself could not result in constitutional 
violations, and even if there were a defect in the warrant or in its issuance, the good faith exception to 
suppression would apply.”). 
 195. See supra note 158. 
 196. See supra note 177.  
 197. See United States v. Rivera, No. 2:15-cr-00266, 2016 BL 442928, at *7–8 (E.D. La. Jul. 19, 
2016) (explaining that suppression is warranted where Rule 41 is violated “only warranted if the 
defendant’s constitutional rights were violated or the defendant experienced prejudice”). 
 198. United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-RJB, 2016 BL 446405, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 
30, 2016) (quoting United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id.  
 201. See, e.g., United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 443 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“To demonstrate 
that the violation of Rule 41 was of constitutional magnitude, [defendant] must show a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.”). 
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is invalid, a warrant is not required to obtain an IP address, as one does 
not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in information knowingly 
conveyed to third parties.202 Defendants maintain the argument is 
inapposite in a situation where one actively masks this information by 
using Tor.203 Some courts remain unpersuaded,204 but others have found 
a meaningful distinction between one who knowingly exposes and 
purposefully takes steps to hide their IP address by using Tor.205 Still, the 
difference between whether the Playpen defendants have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their masked IP addresses or not is 
inconsequential where courts determined that the NIT Warrant is valid, 
or suppression is inappropriate.206  
Courts have ultimately decided that the reliance upon the NIT 
Warrant was objectively reasonable for multiple reasons. Specifically, the 
FBI affiant explained why the NIT was necessary, described the 
mechanics of deploying the NIT, described the nature of Playpen, and 
explained the particulars of what was to be searched by using the NIT.207 
Beyond the objective reasonableness, consideration was given to the 
ramifications of permitting culpable actors to circumvent responsibility 
weighed against “marginal deterrence, if any, that would result from 
suppression.”208 No court thus far has found that any potential 
deterrence to be gained from dismissal would outweigh the societal 
costs.209 
 
 202. See, e.g., United States v. Kahler, 236 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1020 (E.D. Mich. 2017) (summarizing 
the government’s argument “[relying] on the consensus among the Federal Courts of Appeal that there 
is no constitutionally recognizable privacy interest in an IP address.”); see also supra note 17. 
 203. See, e.g., United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920, 930–33 (W.D. Ark. 2016) (discussing 
the IP address issue at length). 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1053 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016) (finding 
the defendant’s sense of anonymity to “not negate the fact that, in order to gain that feeling of 
anonymity, he voluntarily disclosed his IP address to the operator of the first Tor node”). 
 205. See, e.g., Kahler, 236 F. Supp. at 1021 (“Internet use pervades modern life. Law enforcement, 
acting alone, may not coerce the computers of internet users into revealing identifying information 
without a warrant, at least when the user has taken affirmative steps to ensure that third parties do 
not have that information.”). 
 206. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 250 F. Supp. 3d 1215, 1236 (N.D. Ala. 2017) (even 
“[a]ssuming either a constitutional violation or prejudice under Rule 41(b) . . . the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule applies here”). 
 207. See, e.g., United States v. Tippens, No. 3:16-cr-05110-RJB, 2016 BL 446405, at *9 (W.D. 
Wash. Nov. 30, 2016) (“relying on the [NIT] Warrant was objectively reasonable.”).  
 208. Order at 6, U.S. v. Kneitel, No. 8:16-cr-23-T-35JSS (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2017), Dkt. No.158: 
[E]ven the cost of allowing this single defendant to go freean individual who had been 
admittedly viewing and downloading child pornography for more than a decade . . . would 
far outweigh the benefit of preserving the precise adherence to a complicated and imprecise 
Rule application, especially where the Rule has now been modified. 
 209. This assertion is based upon a thorough search of Westlaw and Bloomberg Law databases as 
of Feb. 1, 2018. 
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3.   Motions to Compel Source Code: “Disclosure is not currently 
an option.”210 
After requests for dismissals proved unproductive, those fighting 
their indictments in the Playpen cases have sought to compel the 
government to provide the full NIT source code in discovery.211 The 
government is required to produce certain “documents and objects” 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E) provided that the 
information is “material to preparing the defense.”212 The discovery 
battles relating to the NIT source code, center on the amount of 
information the defense argues is “material” weighed against the 
government’s efforts to protect the code as privileged for security 
reasons.213 The government objected to supplying the full NIT source 
code but has provided parts of the code to experts,214 maintaining that 
disclosure of the full source code is not necessary.215 However, 
defendants have said that the information provided is not enough to 
ensure a fair trial.216 A main reason for this argument, it appears, is a 
desire to have defense expertsfully equipped with appropriate security 
clearancesexamine the code for potential defenses.217 For example, the 
 
 210. Gov’t’s Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment Without Prejudice, at *2, United States  
v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 2017), Dkt. No. 227.  
 211. See Joseph Cox, The Other Reason the FBI Doesn’t Want to Reveal Its Hackings Techniques, 
VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 30, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
read/fbi-hacking-techniques. 
 212. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. See, e.g., Tippens, 2016 BL 446405, at *12–13 (“The NIT code and other 
requested discovery is discoverable under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 (a)(1)(E) because of its potential bearing 
on Defendants’ motions, including the constitutional challenges to the NIT Warrant.”). 
 213. See Hennessey & Weaver, supra note 151. 
 214. See Hennessey & Weaver, supra note 151 (“Knowledge of how the exploit works is the most 
sensitive part of an NIT-public disclosure not only risks losing the opportunity to use the technique 
against other offenders but would also permit criminals or authoritarian governments to use it for 
illicit purposes until a patch is developed and deployed.”). Similarly to the case of Scarfo, supra Part 
III.B., the government has utilized § 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act to keep a close grip 
over the code. See, e.g., Tippens, 2016 BL 446405, at *13 (“[T]he Government made a sufficient 
showing to justify withholding the remaining portions of the NIT code and other discovery from 
Defendants.”). For an explanation of the three-step framework utilized for evaluating CIPA  
§ 4 motions, see United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 904 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 215. See, e.g., Decl. of FBI Special Agent Daniel Alfin in Support of Gov’t’s Motion For 
Reconsideration, ¶ 7, U.S. v. Michaud, No. 3L15 cr-05351-RJB (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2016) Dkt. No. 
166-2 (providing that “knowing how someone unlocked the front door provides no information about 
what that person did after entering the house. Determining whether the government exceeded the 
scope of the warrant thus requires an analysis of the NIT instructions delivered to Michaud’s 
computer, not the method by which they were delivered.”). 
 216. See Joseph Cox, Judge Rules FBI Must Reveal Malware It Used to Hack over 1,000 
Computers, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 18, 2016, 2:02 PM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/jpgmdd/judge-rules-fbi-must-reveal-malware-used-
to-hack-over-1000-computers-playpen-jay-michaud (“[A]ccording to [defense expert, Vlad] 
Tsyrklevitch, the code was apparently missing several parts.”). 
 217. See Joseph Cox & Sarah Jeong, FBI Is Pushing Back Against Judge’s Order to Reveal Tor 
Browser Exploit, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 29, 2016, 7:10 AM), 
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NIT was not encrypted, opening up the possibility that the FBI’s server 
was vulnerable to either third-party interception or tampering.218 
Experts, it is argued, need the full source code to determine areas of 
reasonable doubt for their clients, as well as to confirm the government 
only collected the information it professed to collect.219  
Some motions to compel disclosure of the NIT code have resulted in 
dismissals. For example, the DOJ dropped its charges against Jay 
Michaud rather than reveal the full source code to an expert witness 
under narrow conditions.220 The judge in Michaud’s case said that 
although the technical details were “lost on [him]” he understood the 
underlying question of the motion: “[y]ou say you caught me by the 
use of computer hacking, so how do you do it? How do you do it? A fair 
question. And the government should respond under seal . . . and say 
here’s how we did it.”221 However, a couple months later, after the 
government refused to comply with the order, the judge granted the 
government’s motion to reconsider while simultaneously issuing 
sanctions against them.222 Then, the court threw out all the evidence 
obtained from the NIT by granting a motion to suppress.223 In response 
to the suppression order, the government first filed an interlocutory 
appeal, then withdrew its appeal and filed a motion to dismiss the 
indictment without prejudice.224 In this motion, the government 
provided that it had to seek dismissal without prejudice because of its 
 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gv5vy3/fbi-is-pushing-back-against-judges-order-to-
reveal-tor-browser-exploit. 
 218. See Decl. of Dr. Christopher Soghoian, ¶ 19, U.S. v. Matish, No. 4:16-cr-00016 (E.D. Va. Jun. 
10, 2016), Dkt. No. 83-1. But see Hennessey & Weaver, supra note 151:  
The lack of encryption on the information transmitted . . . is a feature which enhances the 
chain of custody by providing visibility. For an unknown third party to tamper with this 
communication in a way which would have been prevented by encryption, that third party 
would need to have advance awareness of the FBI’s activity, posses a valid login for the 
hidden site hosting the NIT . . . and simultaneously have a detailed profile of the target’s 
computer. 
 219. See, e.g., Hennessey & Weaver, supra note 151 (“NITs offer the defense an opportunity to 
perform a detailed evaluation of the functionality, to determine what the NIT searched for, how it 
conducted the search, what data was seized, and the chain of custody.”). 
 220. See Gov’t’s Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment Without Prejudice at 1, U.S.  
v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351, (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 2017); see also Transcript of Motions Hearing, 
supra note 184, at 18. 
 221. Transcript of Motions Hearing, at 14, United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 17, 2016). 
 222. Joseph Cox, Judge Changes Mind, Says FBI Doesn’t Have to Reveal Tor Browser Hack, VICE: 
MOTHERBOARD (May 13, 2016, 7:50 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/ 
ezpp7e/judge-changes-mind-says-fbi-doesnt-have-to-reveal-tor-browser-hack. 
 223. Order Denying Dismissal & Excluding Evidence, United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351 
(W.D. Wash. May 25, 2016), Dkt. No. 212. 
 224. See Gov’t’s Unopposed Mot. to Dismiss Indictment Without Prejudice, supra note 210, at 1–2. 
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unwillingness to disclose the NIT’s full source code as “[d]isclosure [of 
the NIT’s full source code] is not currently an option.”225 
If Michaud did commit the heinous acts he was accused of in his 
indictment then the fact that the government was unwilling to provide 
his expert access to the source code used to deploy malware is incredibly 
troubling. This move speaks to the value the FBI has attached to 
preserving the option to use the exploit in future investigations.226 It 
undoubtedly was a difficult decision on the part of the government; one 
that is unable to be fully judged without all the facts surrounding it.227 
However, given the horrific nature of the crimes at issue, it isfrom this 
vantage pointa maddening conclusion. The conflict between public 
transparency and the level of secrecy required to maintain effective 
investigation tactics is arguably at its most heated when the government 
is sooner willing to dismiss charges against an accused child abuser than 
to comply with a court order to produce information to ensure a fair 
trial.228 Legislative response addressing and resolving these tensions is 
not only appropriate but desperately needed. 
IV.  TITLE III FOR GOVERNMENT HACKING  
A. WARRANT AUTHORIZATION  
The recent amendments to Rule 41(b) have prompted discussion of 
warrant authorization: namely, the authority of an un-elected bodythe 
Advisory Rules Committee229to authorize a new exception to warrant 
authorization without public consideration and the concern that some 
judges may not understand the technology that they are asked to approve 
 
 225. Id. 
 226. Michael Nunez, FBI Drops All Charges in Child Porn Case to Keep Sketchy Spying Methods 
Secret, GIZMODO (Mar. 6, 2017, 4:35 PM), https://gizmodo.com/fbi-drops-all-charges-in-child-porn-
case-to-keep-sketch-1793009653 (“The FBI basically said they’d rather have [the defendant] go free 
than reveal the code, because if the code becomes publicly available, the ability to use this investigatory 
technique in the future is impaired.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 227. See, e.g., Hennessey & Weaver, supra note 151 (arguing “a compromise to one small part of 
an exploit could harm a vast array of incredibly important national interests. The question is one of 
balance and the ultimate determination is for a judge.”). 
 228. See Joseph Cox, Lawyers: FBI Must Reveal Malware for Hacking Child Porn Users or Drop 
Its Case, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 25, 2016, 4:35 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/ 
en_us/article/ezpvp4/fbi-playpen-malware-NIT-jay-michaud. 
 229. See Steven M. Bellovin et al., Insecure Surveillance: Technical Issues with Remote Computer 
Searches, COMMC’NS & PRIVACY UNDER SURVEILLANCE, Mar. 2016, at 14:  
In the US, the Judicial Conferencean administrative body of senior federal judges headed 
by the chief justice of the Supreme Courtframes policy guidelines for all federal courts. 
Proposed changes to federal rules are submitted, after public comment, by five advisory 
committees to the Judicial Conference’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, which upon its approval forwards them to the Supreme Court and Congress for 
final approval. 
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of in warrant applications. As discussed above, Rule 41 “governs the 
authorization of searches and seizures” in the United States.230 As of 
December 31, 2016, Rule 41 now includes leave of a magistrate judge “to 
issue a warrant to use remote access to search electronic storage media 
and to seize or copy electronically stored information located within or 
outside that district if . . . the district where the media or information is 
located has been concealed through technological means.”231 This means 
that moving forward, a magistrate judge will have the authority to issue 
a warrant authorizing deployment of malware across the globe.232 
Beyond any foreign policy concerns of this authority,233 there remains 
unease over the quick jurisdictional fix provided by a non-elected 
body.234 A major criticism to these changes to Rule 41 is that the 
amendment assumes that hacking is a lawful activity when Congress has 
never actually authorized it.235 Unlike wiretaps,236 there is currently no 
legislative authority for government hacking of computers. This is not to 
say that the government’s use of deploying malware in the course of their 
investigations is inherently unlawful. However, the level of secrecy is 
compounded by the lack of oversight and reliance upon judicial 
technological expertise in the absence of any guidance. 
The Fourth Amendment itself does not address the powers of federal 
judges. However, case law illuminates the judiciary’s importance as 
 
 230. Id.  
 231. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(A) (emphasis added). For a background on the Rule change, see 
Appellee’s Opening Brief, United v. Levin, No. 16-1567 (1st Cir. Feb. 2017), 2017 WL 512509, at *2: 
In April 2013, a decision was issued from the Southern District of Texas that denied a 
warrant request to conduct a remote access search of a computer in an unknown location. 
In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 758 F. Supp. 2d 753 
(S.D. Tex. 2013) . . . That decision prompted the Department of Justice to formally request 
an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
 232. For a criticism of this authority, see Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Found. & Am. 
Civ. Liberties Union of Mass. In Support of Defendant-Appellee & Affirmance, United States  
v. Levin, No. 16-1567, at 3 (1st Cir. Feb. 10, 2017) (“A warrant that authorized the search of hundreds 
or thousands of homes, without identifying specific buildings or specifying where those buildings were 
located, would be rejected out of hand even if those searches were limited to identifying the person 
residing there.”); Robyn Greene, Congress Must Pass the Stopping Mass Hacking Act, NEW AM. (June 
1, 2016), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/blog/congress-must-pass-stopping-mass-hacking-act/. 
 233. For a discussion on the implications of this, see Ghappour, supra note 57. 
 234. For criticisms of the Rule 41 changes, see, for example, Bellovin et al., supra note 229, at  
14 (finding the changes to Rule 41 to “confuse legitimate uses of location-anonymizing software with 
nefarious activity, and . . . likely . . . be both intrusive and damaging”); Press Release, Ron Wyden, 
United States Senator, Wyden: Untested Government Mass Hacking Techniques Threaten Digital 
Security, Critical Infrastructure (June 30, 2016), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/ 
press-releases/wyden-untested-government-mass-hacking-techniques-threaten-digital-security-
critical-infrastructure (“Nobody can see years into the future to tell us what mass hacking by criminals 
or by law enforcement will be capable of doing. And if these changes go into effect, there will be no 
guidelines in place to ensure that the privacy and security of Americans are being protected.”). 
 235. See Greene, supra note 232. 
 236. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2022 (2016). 
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gatekeepers between law enforcement and individual civil liberties. 
Below is an excerpt from an evidentiary hearing in one of the Playpen 
cases (since dismissed by motion of the government to avoid disclosure 
of the source code) where a U.S. District Court Judge seeks clarity 
regarding what the NIT did: 
THE COURT: Do the FBI experts have any way to look at the NIT 
information other than going to the server?  
MR. FIEMAN: Your Honor, they don’t go to the server.  
THE COURT: Where do they go? How do they get the information?  
MR. FIEMAN: They get it from Mr. Michaud’s computer.  
THE COURT: They don’t have his computer.  
MR. FIEMAN: That’s what the NIT is for.  
THE COURT: You see, this is what is confusing to me. It has a lot to do with 
where the search occurred. How do they find information? Maybe you need 
to call a witness on these things. . . I want to know what the user has to do 
to trigger this NIT, if anything. Then I want to know what does the FBI guy 
do to find out wherethe information that the NIT provides, how does he 
get that? I suppose there is somebody sitting in a cubicle somewhere with 
a keyboard doing this stuff. I don’t know that. It may be they seed the 
clouds, and the clouds rain information. I don’t know. . . I don’t want the 
detail. It wouldn’t mean anything to me anyway. But I understand enough 
to know that if you want to see something on your computer, you have to 
turn it on and hit the right strokes, or else you are just in there playing 
solitaire or something. I don’t care what the strokes are. I don’t care about 
that. I just want to know what’s available and how they would do it.237 
The above exchange would never occur in the context of a warrant 
to search a house, a car, or a store because the authority responsible for 
evaluating the legal elements of a valid warrant understand how police 
officers search physical spaces. Without that understanding, can a judge 
make a meaningful decision? While the dialogue above was taken from a 
hearing of a district court judge and does not involve consideration of a 
warrant application, it serves as a perfect example of why the 
amendments to Rule 41 warrant pause. A potential issue here is that 
those authorized to issue searches like those under the NIT Warrant do 
not necessarily understand the technology that they are authorizing.238 
The technology involved here is complex and the government utilizes 
sophisticated investigative tactics. Technology grows at a faster rate than 
the law can handle and it is not a slight to the intelligence of judges to call 
their technological expertise into question.  
 
 237. Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note 184, at 50. 
 238. Joseph Cox, Judge in FBI Hacking Case Is Unclear on How FBI Hacking Works, VICE: 
MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 27, 2016, 9:50 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/read/judge-in-fbi-hacking-
case-is-unclear-on-how-fbi-hacking-works. 
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If judges do not understand the technology then they cannot 
understand the government action that they authorize. This is not to 
suggest that judges are unable to learn what they need to know to make 
competent decisions in authorizing warrants. Judges are tasked with 
learning convoluted and complicated matters in the course of their 
careers. However, in many settings, judges benefit from the adversarial 
nature of the legal system by hearing from opposing sides. When a 
warrant is requested from a judge, there only is the government before 
the court. Joseph Cox, a journalist for Vice Motherboard, who has 
written extensively on government hacking concluded that although 
some judges in cases involving NITs do not understand how hacking 
works, the fault is not placed squarely on the courts as “it’s arguably a 
problem stemming from how the [government] ha[s] framed and 
referred to NITs in legal documents.”239 Either way, instead of critically 
evaluating the operation that they are being asked to authorize, judges, 
as finders of fact, may have to defer to the experts, in this instance the 
FBI, on issues of technological fact.240 
To address concerns of technological competence, stringent 
requirements for Continuing Judicial Education should be mandated for 
all federal judges at the magistrate and district level.241 Above all, these 
requirements should focus on ensuring competency on government 
hacking and surveillance technology as it pertains to the authorization of 
warrants. An alternative option is that judges who complete a set amount 
of hours or specific courses could be certified to handle warrants 
requiring a specialized understanding of investigative tools that go 
beyond physical spaces. This standard ensures that those tasked with the 
authority are well equipped with the necessary foundation to evaluate 
applications before their courts. Regardless of the solution, it is 
paramount that those vested with the authority to authorize warrants 
which lead to deployment of malware are in a position to consider the 
request on all its levels. While venue issues are resolved with the updated 
Rule 41,242 across the board judicial understanding of the technology they 
are tasked to authorize will not be without further discussion. 
 
 239. Id.; see also MACKEY ET AL., supra note 27, at 7 (describing the shortcomings of metaphors 
used to compare IP addresses to physical street addresses or license plates in warrant applications). 
 240. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1367 (2009). 
 241. Currently, “[t]here are no mandatory educational requirements or standards for federal 
judges, but the majority take advantage of Center offerings.” INT’L JUDICIAL RELATIONS OFFICE, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., EDUC. AND RESEARCH FOR THE U.S. FED. COURTS (2014), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/2015/About-FJC-English-2014-10-07.pdf. 
 242. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). 
AUCOIN (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2018  1:31 PM 
June 2018] THE SPIDER'S PARLOR 1463 
B. WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHMEN? 
Despite that the FBI has used malware for almost two decades, law 
enforcement has yet to seek clear authority from Congress to use this 
technology.243 Law enforcement instead seeks judicial sanction to utilize 
its malware “on an ad hoc basis” by applying, vaguely, for search warrants 
under Rule 41.244 Executive restraint, while a good thing, is not enough 
on its own. One of the Playpen courts found the NIT Warrant to be 
proper, in part, because the warrant authorized the FBI to do more than 
the FBI did: namely, the FBI chose not to deploy the NIT on a target until 
that target logged onto Playpen, however, the warrant authorized 
deployment upon arrival to the hidden service.245 The fact that the 
warrant authorized more than what the agents did should not make 
people feel better because a court of law did not impose that restraint.246 
But, even more so than the capriciousness of relying upon executive 
restraint, “[g]overnment action that actively sabotages or even 
collaterally undermines digital security is too important to be left open to 
executive whim.”247 After all, a fundamental aspect of American 
government is the checks and balances of government powers. 
Unlike other mediums of communications, the dark web is no man’s 
land. The level of secrecy in government hacking, while necessary to a 
degree, is complicated by the lack of oversight. Government hacking as 
an investigatory tool implicates apprehensions which cannot be resolved 
without public awareness and legislative discussion regarding the means 
of use and extent of judicial oversight. There must be a discussion of our 
lawmakers in order for the liberties of all people to be safeguarded. 
Congress has all the tools it needs to do so. Chris Soghoian, provides, “[i]f 
 
 243. See Motion to Unseal Court Docket Sheet at 2, In re Sealed Docket Sheet Associated With 
Malware Warrant Issued on July 22, 2013, No. 1:16-cv-03029-JKB (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2016) (pertaining 
to the Freedom Hosting investigation). 
 244. Id.  
 245. See Opinion & Order at 8, United States v. Matish, No. 4:16-cr-00016-HCM-RJK (E.D. Va. 
Jun. 23, 2016) (explaining that “the FBI deployed the NIT in a much narrower fashion than what the 
warrant authorized”).  
 246. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967): 
 
It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that 
this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. . . . In the 
absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground 
that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily 
confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end. 
 247. Andrew Crocker, What to Do About Lawless Government Hacking and the Weakening of 
Digital Security, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/08/ 
what-do-about-lawless-government-hacking-and-weakening-digital-security. 
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Congress decides this is a technique that’s perfectly appropriate, maybe 
that’s OK. But let’s have an informed debate about it.”248 
The FBI is believed to have deployed the NIT in the Playpen cases 
upon the thousands by exploiting a Tor browser vulnerability.249 As 
discussed above, the full source code of the NIT and the exploit used to 
deploy it, is unknown to the public as well as defendants because the 
government has refused to release the full code.250 The government 
maintains that it is unwilling to do so at this time because of the 
importance of the code remaining secret. This is even after at least one of 
the Playpen defendants secured a defense expert with top level security 
clearance specifically to accommodate the sensitive nature of the 
discovery requested.251  
Governments, the United States included, search for vulnerabilities 
like the one used in the Playpen investigation to exploit them to collect 
intelligence or for purposes of surveillance.252 These vulnerabilities are 
stored by governments, again, the United States included, for future 
use.253 This is problematic because once a vulnerability is found there is 
a risk that it may be discovered by others who may use the vulnerability 
for malicious purposes.254 While the government openly recognizes the 
dire threats of cybercrime,255 it continues to engage in activities which, 
without oversight, may put citizens at further risk because by taking 
“step[s] to create, acquire, stockpile or exploit weaknesses in digital 
security, it risks making us all less safe by failing to bolster that 
security.”256 Perhaps the saying that “guns don’t kill people, people do” 
would be appropriate here, however, it would miss the point entirely in 
terms of exploits. The analogy would possibly work in a situation where 
a police officer finds a gun on the sidewalk, leaves it there in case she may 
need it in the future, all the while leaving open the possibility of discovery 
 
 248. Poulsen, supra note 48. 
 249. The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 65. 
 250. See Lily Hay Newman, The Feds Would Rather Drop a Child Porn Case than Give Up a Tor 
Exploit, WIRED (Mar. 7, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/feds-rather-drop-child-
porn-case-give-exploit; Government’s Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment Without Prejudice, 
United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 2017) (“Because the 
government remains unwilling to disclose certain discovery related to the FBI’s deployment of a [NIT] 
as part of its investigation into the Playpen child pornography site, the government has no choice but 
to seek dismissal of the indictment.”). 
 251. Third Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Compel Discovery at 1 n.3, 
United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351 (W.D. Wash. Jan 14, 2016).  
 252. See Crocker, supra note 247. 
 253. Crocker, supra note 247.  
 254. Crocker, supra note 247. 
 255. Leslie R. Caldwell, Legislative Proposals to Protect Online Privacy and Security (Mar. 9, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/legislative-proposals-protect-online-privacy-and-
security.  
 256. Crocker, supra note 247. 
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by nefarious figures. This absurd hypothetical is neither believable nor 
an entirely accurate analogy. But its absurdity perhaps drives the point 
across. By exploiting security flaws, the government is not leaving 
weapons on the street, rather, they are discovering things that could be 
used as weapons, exploiting them in their own investigations, and leaving 
that possibility open for others to do the same. Here, there is more at 
stake than the invasion of privacy of the “bad guys.” There are undeniable 
benefits to the use of government malware, in fact, the use may be 
entirely necessary in today’s world. However, there are also costs, and 
those costs grow exponentially when there is no oversight. Without rules 
and oversight, the question becomes: who will watch the watchmen? 
C. UNCHARTED STATUTORY TERRITORY 
 “Electronic surveillance succeeds because it is secret.”257 The 
element of secrecy surrounding a particular application of surveillance 
thus takes priority over the law’s purpose to limit executive discretion.258 
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, three statutes collected under the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”) are crucial to 
that end.259 Title I of the ECPA, also known as the Wiretap Act, or Title 
III,260 regulates the interception of transmitted communications.261 Title 
II of the ECPA, also known as the Stored Communications Act governs 
how communication service providers may disclose the metadata and 
contents of customers’ stored information.262 Title III pertains to pen 
registers and trap trace devices.263  
While some critics take issue with the fact that the government 
engages in hacking at all, it is undeniable that this form of surveillance 
has a place in investigation of crimes as well as protection of national 
security.264 Furthermore, as freedom is not limitless, “it seems only 
proper that the vast freedoms of the Internet be subject to the same rule 
of law and protections that we accept for the rest of society.”265 That said, 
the use of hacking as an investigative tool on behalf of the government is 
 
 257. Crocker, supra note 76. 
 258. Crocker, supra note 76.  
 259. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, SEARCHING AND 
SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS ix (2009). 
 260. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Title III of The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (Wiretap Act), BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/ 
statutes/1284 (last updated Sept. 19, 2013). 
 261. Title I of the ECPA is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
 262. Title II of the ECPA is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 263. Title III of the ECPA is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012).  
 264. See Jonathan Mayer, You Can’t Backdoor a Platform, WEB POL’Y (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://webpolicy.org/2015/04/28/you-cant-backdoor-a-platform. 
 265. Editorial Board, supra note 41. 
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not per se unconstitutional,266 as “[h]ackingjust like kicking down a 
door and looking through someone’s stuffis a perfectly legal tactic for 
law enforcement officers, provided they have a warrant.”267 However, 
unlike kicking down a door, a problematic aspect of warrants in the 
context of hacking is that issues arise when the places to be searched are 
less clear cut than, say, a public phone booth.268 Furthermore, the act 
deals with uncharted statutory territory.  
Congress should enact a comprehensive statute like Title III for 
government hacking to set clear standards and guidance for law 
enforcement, thereby legitimatizing its hacking operations and 
safeguarding individual liberties through oversight.269 Andrew Crocker, 
a Staff Attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, has advocated 
for such a move, providing “[j]ust as with wiretapping, we should be 
mindful of the need for both constitutional and statutory law to keep up 
with the use of hacking for surveillance.”270 Unlike traditional warrants, 
wiretap orders, authorized by Title III warrants, are far more stringent.271 
In addition to the high bar law enforcement needs to meet to obtain a 
Title III warrant,272 once obtained, Title III warrants require 
minimization procedures to be put in place to ensure the least amount of 
intrusion possible.273 Furthermore, the public receives annual updates on 
the number and type of wiretaps utilized by the government as a mandate 
of the statute.274 A Title III for government hacking could mandate 
similar protections by: setting a high bar for issuance of hacking orders, 
ensuring utilization of malware as a last resort when other, less intrusive 
means, are insufficient, compelling minimization requirements to curtail 
 
 266. See, e.g., Government Hacking and Subversion of Digital Security, supra note 75, at 575 n.16 
(“[M]y view is that hacking can be a legitimate and effective law enforcement technique. I also use the 
term to promote consistency and avoid ambiguity.”). 
 267. McLaughlin, supra note 111. 
 268. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353–54 (1967). 
 269. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 247 (“Given the dangers posed by government malware, the 
public would likely be better served by the enactment of affirmative rules, something like a ‘Title III 
for Hacking.’”).  
 270. Crocker, supra note 76. 
 271. See Carrell, supra note 81, at 208; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 260 (providing that the 
Wiretap Act “prohibits the unauthorized, nonconsensual interception of ‘wire, oral, or electronic 
communications’ by government agencies as well as private parties[;] establishes procedures for 
obtaining warrants to authorize wiretapping by government officials, and[;] regulates the disclosure 
and use of authorized intercepted communications by investigative and law enforcement officers”). 
 272. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012) (detailing the processes and procedures for applying and issuing 
wiretap orders); 29. Electronic SurveillanceTitle III Affidavits, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-29-electronic-surveillance-title-iii-
affidavits (last updated Jan. 2018). 
 273. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012) (explaining minimization of interference).  
 274. See 18 U.S.C. § 2519 (2012) (providing public reporting requirements). 
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information obtained and risk posed, requiring public reporting on an 
annual basis, and other specifications as Congress deems appropriate.275  
The real concern is regarding how online surveillance is conducted, 
rather than that it is conducted at all.276 The problem is that unlike other 
forms of technology (for example, phones), there is currently no statutory 
framework in place to guide law enforcement or the public. It is beyond 
question that law enforcement needs to apprehend individuals who use 
Tor and Virtual Private Networks known as “VPNs”277 to access the illicit 
sites at issue in Operation Torpedo, and Operation Pacifier. Wrongdoers 
cannot be permitted to evade justice through technological advances, so 
law enforcement must be empowered to prevent such evasion.278 
However, it is the means of apprehension, not the ends, which give 
pause. It is especially difficult to focus upon this concern in the context 
of investigations tackling child pornography, given the unforgiveable 
nature of crimes against children. Legislative intervention is increasingly 
more necessary as technology grows and it becomes clear that the 
constitutional protections in place are not enough alone to ensure that 
privacy and security considerations are not swept to the side. 
CONCLUSION 
It is problematic that the government uses its authority to invade 
personal spaces within the home without oversight. This is not to suggest 
that the aims of law enforcement in using NITs are unimportant, nor is it 
an assertion that law enforcement should be prevented from 
apprehending offenders. No one should be empowered to break the law 
just because they may be technologically savvy enough to avoid detection, 
especially when committing arguably the most heinous crime one can 
 
 275. Crocker, supra note 76. See Freiwald, supra note 4: 
In the wake of decades of hearings, numerous rejected bills, and intense public debate, the 
Wiretap Act achieved a workable compromise that has largely stood the test of time. All 
branches of government and countless experts had input into the design of the Wiretap Act. 
It provides a comprehensive scheme that strictly limits law enforcement’s use of electronic 
surveillance and provides several mechanisms to ensure that. 
 276. See Kate Knibbs, The FBI Has Its Own Secret Brand of Malware, GIZMODO (Apr. 2, 2015, 
11:45 AM), https://gizmodo.com/the-fbi-has-its-own-secret-brand-of-malware-1694821520 (“The 
extent to which we’re being kept in the dark about government spyware is not necessary.”). 
 277. What Is a VPN? And Why You Should Use a VPN on Public Wi-Fi, NORTON BY SYMANTEC, 
https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-privacy-what-is-a-vpn.html (last visited May 7, 2018): 
A virtual private network (VPN) gives you online privacy and anonymity by creating a 
private network from a public Internet connection. VPNs mask your [IP] address so your 
online actions are virtually untraceable. Most important, VPN services establish secure and 
encrypted connections, guaranteed to provide greater privacy than even a secured Wi-Fi 
hotspot.  
Id. 
 278. See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 778 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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commit (crimes against children). However, “[i]n our society, the rule of 
law sets limits on what government can and cannot do, no matter how 
important its goals.”279 As Justice Brandeis warned in his Olmstead 
dissent, “[i]f the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy.”280 For laws to work, people must respect the law. If law 
enforcement is seen as bending the rules to do its job, regardless of how 
significant that job is, this will breed a view of their operations as 
illegitimateand, by extension, will give the entire government the 
shadow of illegitimacy.  
Right now, it is easy not to care about the lack of legislative oversight 
over government hacking, because the only people implicated (as far as 
the public knows) are those exploiting children. However, that does not 
mean we should ignore the implications of establishing far reaching 
precedents, nor ignore suggestions of overstep even in the pursuit of 
those viewing pure contraband. The descriptions of the content available 
on these despicable websites makes it very easy to forget the potential 
repercussions of allowing law enforcement unlimited power to 
apprehend people behind their computer screens without oversight. 
Even a cursory reading of the unsealed applications and affidavits in the 
Playpen cases is enough to illustrate the importance of apprehension.281 
The technology requested by law enforcement is left arguably vague but 
the enemy illustrated by the applications is anything but.  
Online browsing activity weaves an intricate web stringing together 
all the virtual places visited from the comfort of our physical and private 
locations. This web paints its own kind of picture: it identifies traits and 
stockpiles information; it tracks activities, purchases, and real world 
locations; and it provides a way to pinpoint a source to criminal behavior. 
Many people do not think about the trail left behind with each click of a 
link, or search in an engine. But some take elaborate measures to 
circumvent tracking to visit online spaces in the dark. This circumvention 
is in many ways a legitimate reaction to the magnitude of privacy 
concerns posed by the digital revolution and an important tool in 
combatting those concerns. However, it is also a tool which empowers 
predators like those in the Playpen cases to abuse anonymity and elude 
capture. In turn, it has caused the government to take steps that should 
give one pause when confronting the repercussions of due process.  
 
 279. Crocker, supra note 247. 
 280. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 281. See, e.g., Application & Affidavit of FBI Special Agent Douglas Macfarlane, In re Search of 
Computers that Access upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2015) (the 
application which led to the authorization of the NIT Warrant). 
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Unlike the characters in Mary Howitt’s poem, The Spider and the 
Fly, the prey and the predator are muddled by situations like the one in 
the Playpen cases. There may be something to be said for the poetic 
justice in the progression of the predator becoming the prey, however, we 
do not live in a lawless society where the ends can always justify the 
means. Just as it is easy to be caught up in the dragnet, it is not difficult 
to find ways in which to excuse the government’s behavior in order to 
reconcile their ensnaring the “bad guys.” This is dangerous thinking. 
Without Congressional intervention to outline the boundaries of the use 
of the grey in these criminal investigations, the government risks losing 
much more than a trialit risks the loss of legitimacy. 
While the premise of prioritizing the protection of children over all 
elseincluding over the due process rights of predators—has moral 
merit, it does not fit into the legal fabric of the United States. There is 
much more at stake than invasions on those committing the “Crime 
Everyone Hates.”282 The U.S. criminal justice system is based upon a 
presumption of innocence; the law protects everyone, from the most 
loathsome offender to the purest innocent. The Constitution does not 
pick and choose who is worthy beyond that of citizenry and requisite 
contacts.283 Even if that were not so, and one were to draw the line of due 
process at child pornography, what is to prevent that line from moving 
further and further until we live in a society where the mere accusation 
of any crime is enough to strip one of their entitlement to due process? 
One person may easily draw a line for sex offenders, specifically child 
predators, while the next person may easily do the same for non-violent 
drug offenders. Whose line prevails here? Unfortunately, drawing lines 
in the sand is not a viable solution. In the interim, while distracted by the 
waves, we risk erosion of civil liberties. 
 
 
 282. In his blog, Scott Greenfield refers to Michaud’s charges as the “Crime Everyone Hates” in 
discussing the implications of the possibility that the Government would rather dismiss charges 
against him than disclose the Tor Browser exploit. Scott Greenfield, Is “Under No Circumstances” 
Acceptable, Judge?, SIMPLE JUSTICE BLOG (Apr. 26, 2016), https://blog.simplejustice.us/ 
2016/04/26/is-under-no-circumstances-acceptable-judge.  
 283. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269–74 (1990) (discussing who “the 
people” are under the Fourth Amendment).  
